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Abstract 
'Ve show that there exists a social choice function that cannot be implemented in perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium if the mechanism has an eqllilibrillm with one round of signalling. 
The social choice function can however oe implemented in perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 
ooviously with an equilibrium reaching the second stage. 
1 Introduction 
A recent paper by Bergin and Sen (1996) provides sufficient conditions for implementation 
with extensive form mechanisms when agents have incomplete information. They focus on 
mechanisms in which at least one of the equilibria yielding the desired social choice function 
never goes beyond the first stage (they caIl these 'equilibria with one round of signaling'). In 
an equilibrium with one round of signaling agents send their messages and then an allocation 
is selected as a function of the message profile; it is never the case that after a message profile 
observed with positive probability in equilibrium a new game is reached in which agents are 
required to issue more messages. To put it simply, when each type of each agent behaves in 
the way prescribed by the equilibrium the social choice function (scf) is directly implemented. 
Further stages of the mechanism are only useful to make sure that strategy profiles not yielding 
the desired scf are not perfect Bayesian equilibria. In other words, stages beyond the first are 
useful only because they provide profitable deviations (for sorne type of sorne agent) against 
undesired strategy profiles. 
The idea of concentrating attention on mechanisms with one round of signaling in the in-
complete information case has sorne intuitive appea!. To start with, restricting to this class 
of mechanisms simplifies the analysis and helps to find relatively simple sufficient conditions 
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for implementation. Furthermore, the canonical mechanisms used for subgame perfect imple-
mentation in complete information environments actually have equilibria with one round of 
signaling (see Moore and Repullo [1988] and Abreu and Sen [1990]), so that for the complete 
information case the restriction implies no loss of generality. 
Bergin and Sen leave open the question of whether the restriction implies a loss of generality 
for the incomplete information case, i.e. whether or not it is possible to find a social choice 
function which is implementable vía an extensive form mechanism (and adopting sorne notion of 
sequential rationality) but only with equilibria not having one round of signaling, i.e. equilibria 
reaching stages beyond the first. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that in the incomplete information case it is not true 
that the restriction to equilibria with one round of signaling is without loss of generality. To 
be more precise we show that when certain restrictions on the way beliefs can be updated 
are imposedl, it is possible to find a social choice function which is implementable in perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium only via equilibria reaching the second stage with positive probability. 
This is done in two steps. First, we show that if there exists an equilibrium with one round of 
signaling yielding the desired scf, then there is also a non-optimal perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
Second, we construct a mechanism implementing the social choice function in perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. Obviously, the mechanism cannot have equilibria with one round of signaling. 
Surprisingly enough, in the mechanism we propose for implementation the 'truthtelling' 
cquilibrillm has no pooling of types at the first stage. Full revelation occurs at the first stage, 
so that at the second stage there is complete information along the equilibrium path. The 
reao;on why additional messages are requested at the second stage is that in this way we can 
destroy deceptions yielding undesired functions by making sure that no equilibrium exists at 
that stage when the beliefs are the ones generated by the deception. The same trick does not 
work when the equilibrium is with one round of signaling because when the second stage is 
rcached only by out-of-equilibrium moves there is much more freedom in assigning beliefs. On 
the contrary, when the second stage must be reached in equilibrium we are able to pin down 
the beliefs at that stage under the deception, and design the mechanism in such a way that no 
equilibrium exists when truthtelling was not adopted at the first stage. 
Our result implies that when we look for necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect 
Bayesian implementation, we cannot ignore the possibility that the equilibrium implementing 
the scf needs to go beyond the first stage. It would be interesting, for example, to have a 
complete characterization of scf's implementable in perfect Bayesian equilibrium in economic 
environments, as we have for Bayesian implementation (see Jackson [1991]). When we do this, 
however, we have to consider the possibility that the equilibria used go beyond the first stage. 
Unfortunately this complicates the analysis, especially for necessary conditions. The analysis 
of mechanisms with one round of signaling can be justified on the ground of simplicity, but we 
should be aware that we are limiting the set of implementable social choice functions. 
lBergin and Sen do not state explicitly the restrictions on the way in which beliefs are formed. They simply 
take as given that beliefs must obey certain restrictions and, given the restrictions, they provide conditions for 
implementation in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The restrictions we adopt in this paper are therefore compatible 
with their analysis. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as fo11ows. Section 2 describes the example, detailing 
preferences for each state of the world, probability distribution, information structure;~ the 
sef to be implemented and the notion of equilibrium adopted to predict the out come of the 
mechanism. Section 3 shows that, for this example, any mechanism having an equilibrium 
with one round of signaling yielding the desired scf must have another equilibrium not yielding 
the sef. In section 4 the mechanism for implementation is built. Concluding remarks are in 
section 5, and two appendices collect some definitions and proofs. 
2 The Example 
There are three agents 1,2 and 3 and four possible allocations, {a, b, e, d} . Agent 1 can be of 
two types, t~ and tt. Agent 2 can be ofthree types, t~, t~ and t~, and agent 3 can be oftwo types, 
t~ and t~. The types of agents 1 a!ld 2 are drawn from independent probability distributions 
which satisfy Pr(t~) = ~ and Pr(t~) = Pr(t~) = t The type of agent 3 is correlated with the 
type of agent two. We have Pr (t~ ¡t~) = Pr (tg ¡tb) = ~ and Pr (tg ¡t~) = O. 
The information structure is the following: 
• Agent 1 observes her type and whether or not agent 2's type is t~. 
• Agent 2 observes her type and furthermore, when her type is t~ she al so observes the 
type of agent 3. 
• Agent 3 observes her type and whether or not agent 2 is type t~. 
The preferences of the agents depend on the type profile in the following way: 
Agent 1 
If the type of agent 3 is t~ : 
{
e >- a >- b >- d if t~ 
tI. e >- b '- a '- d if t2 ~. ~ ~ b 
e >- a >- b >- d if t2 e 
{
e >- b >- a >- d if t 2 t~ : c >- a >- b >- d if t~ 
c >- b >- a >- d if t~ 
If the type of agent 3 is t~ : 
c>-a",b",d 
Agent 2 
t2 t3 . { d >- e >- a >- b if t~ 
"a' "a . d >- e >- b >- a if t~ 
t 2 . { d >- c >- b >- a if t~ 
"b' d >- e >- a >- b if t l b 
t~ : { d >- c >- b >- a if tI a d >- c >- a >- b if tt 
{ 
d >- e >- b >- a if tI t~,t~: d>-c>-a>-b if t~ 
b 
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Agent 3 
If the type is t~ then preferences are as follows: 
t2 . { d >- e >- a >- b if t~ 
a . d >- b >- a >- e if tt 
t~ : d IV e IV a IV b 
2 • { d >- e >- b >- a if t~ 
te· d >- a >- b >- e if tt 
If the type is t~ then preferences are: 
d"'a",b",c 
For agent 1 we assume that when the type of agent 3 is t~ then the allocation c always 
gives a utility of 10, the allocation ranked second gives a utility of 1, the allocation ranked 
third gives a utility of zero and allocation d always gives a utility of -1. If the type of agent 3 
is t~ then e is worth 10 and a,b,d are worth zero. For agent 2, we will assume that e gives a 
lltility of 10, d gives a utility of 20, the next-to-last ranked allocation gives a utility of 1, and 
the allocation ranked last gives a utility of O. For agent 3, when the type is t~ and the type 
of agent 2 is t~ or t~ then d is worth 10, the second ranked allocation is worth 2, the third 
ranked allocation is worth 1 and the last allocation is worth O. In all other cases each outcome 
is worth o. 
At last, preferences satisfy the Von Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions. For reader's con-
venience, the numerical values of the utility functions are summarized in Appendix 1. 
The social choice function to be implemented only depends on the types of agents 1 and 2, 
and it is: 
State Allocation 
t~,t~ a 
t~, t~ b 
t~, t~ a 
tt,t~ b 
tl, t~ a 
tl,t~ b 
\Ve will denote by f the scf to be implemented. In our analysis of the implementation prob-
lem for this social choice function we restrict our attention to 'stage games', or games with 
observable actions. Roughly this means that whenever an agent has to move she has perfect 
information about the moves chosen by other agents at previous stages (see Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1991), chapter 8, for a formal definition). This simplifies the analysis, since at each 
information set the relevant uncertainty is only about agents' types, and not about previous 
actions. Furthermore, we will assume that the equilibrium with one round of signaling is in 
pure strategies, Le. at each stage each type takes a given action with probability 1. Bergin 
and Sen use stage games in their paper, and the equilibrium with one round of signaling they 
propase is in pure strategies. 
'Ve now state informally the restrictions on the way beliefs are formed2 : 
2There is no difficulty in formalizing the requirements, but this would need the introduction of lengthy 
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1. The Bayes' rule is adopted on the equilibrium path. 
2. If at stage k agent 1 takes an out of equilibrium action while 2 and 3 takes actions 
prescribed with positive probability by the equilibrium then the beliefs on agents 2 and 
3 at stage k + 1 are updated according to the Bayes' rule. Analogously, if either 2 or 3 
deviate but 1 doesn't then the beliefs on 1 are updated according to the Bayes' rule. 
3. If at sorne stage a type is assigned probability zero then it will have probability zero in 
every subsequent stage. 
The first requirement does not need any comment. The second is a simplified version of 
the 'no signaling what you don't know condition' (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). The last 
requirement is more controversia!. It has been added not because we think it is a particularIy 
good assumption to impose3 but simply because it allows us to simplify the analysis. The 
point of the exercise is to show that for sorne version of perfect Bayesian equilibrium we can 
find a social choice function requiring mechanisms with equilibria going beyond the first stage. 
We do not claim that the version of equilibrium we use is particularIy worth of attention, nor 
\Ve claim that the scf we consider is especially interesting. However, it is important to observe 
that our example would still be valid under a much weaker requirement than the one described 
at point 3. The matter is discussed in a remark at the end of section 4. 
In the rest of the paper we will look at implementation in perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 
meaning that at each stage the strategy of each agent has to be optimal given the beliefs and 
that beliefs are formed obeying the aboye restrictions. 
3 One Round 18 N ot Enough 
In this section we show that whenever a multi-stage mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium with one round of signaling yielding the desired scf then there must exist another perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium yielding an undesired scf. 
Proposition 1 Jf there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with one round of signaling yield-
ing the desired sef, then there exists another perfect Bayesian equilibrium yielding an undesired 
sef. 
Proof. See Appendix 2. O 
The formal proof of proposition 1 is pretty long and involved. We give here a non-rigorous 
and intuitive account. 
defillitions and new notation. 
3The condition that beliefs should have a non-expanding support is used, for example, in the definition of 
pel'fect sequential equilibrium, see Gl'ossman and Perry (1986). The reader should be warned that this kind 
of 'support restriction' assumptions may create existence problems and may rule out sensible equilibria. See 
Madrigal, Tan and Werlang (1987). 
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The proposed information structure has two common knowledge components: One in which 
everybody knows that the type of agent 2 is t~ (we call this the t~ component) and the other 
in which everybody knows that the type of agent 2 is not t~. 
In the equilibrium implementing the scf, agents will take different strategies in the two 
common knowledge components. We show that, whenever there is an equilibrium implementing 
the scf with one round of signaling (truthtelling equilibrium), there must be another PBE in 
which all agents follow in both components the same strategy adopted in the t~-component 
of the truthtelling equilibrium. Thus, in the deception agent 2 always behaves as type t~ did 
in the truthtelling equilibrium, and agents 1,3 always behave as they do in the truthtelling 
equilibrium when t~ has been observed. 
To make sure tha't this is an equilibrium we have to select carefully beliefs after each 
deviation. Beliefs must be such that at each subform the preferences of each agent are such that 
the original strategy adopted in the truthtelling equilibrium for the t~ component is optimal in 
both components. This can be done because stages beyond the first are only reached by out-
of-equilibrium moves, so that we have considerable freedom in assigning beliefs. This is also 
the reason why the scf can be implemented if we avoid equilibria with one round of signaling, 
and instead design the mechanism in such a way that in the truthtelling equilibrium the second 
stage is reached. In this case we have information revelation at the first stage, and at the second 
stage beliefs are fuUy determined. The construction of the alternative equilibrium described 
above reqllired freedom in assigning beliefs. This freedom is denied when the truthtelling 
cqllilibrillm reaches the second stage. 
4 The Mechanism 
'Ve next show that it is possible to build a mechanism implementing the social choice function 
in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Clearly, the equilibrium implementing the function cannot be 
in one round of signaling. 
Stage 1. Agents 1 and 2 are asked to announce the types observed, a social choice function 
and an integer number. Agent 3 is asked to announce the type of agent 2, whether she wants 
the constant function e be implemented and an integer number. Thus the message spaces are: 
• MI = {t!,tn x {{t~,tn,t~} x N. 
• M2 = {t~, t~, t~} x N. 
• M 3 = {{t~,tn ,tn x {0,c} x N. 
Notice that the type of agent 3 is irrelevant to the scf to be implemented and it is not 
reported. Let ¡y[ = MI X M 2 X M 3 , with m as typical elemento We will denote a message by 
agent 1 as mI = (sl,z,n1), a message by agent 2 as m 2 = (s2,n2) and a message by agent 3 
as m3 = (w,g,n3 ). Let us define the following sets: 
A = {m I s2 E w, s2 E z } 
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B = {mi m3 = (·,0,·) } 
The set A is the set of messages such that the reports on types agree. The set B is the set of 
messages such that agent 3 does not ask for e to be implemented. 
The message space is partitioned as follows: 
• dg = {m 1m E A n B, f(sl, s2) = a and ni = O for at least two agents} 
• dg = {mlm E AnB, f(sl,s2) = b and ni = a for at least two agents} 
• dI = {mlm E A, mí. B, and nI = n2 = O} 
• d2 = {mlm í. A and w = z and nI = n3 = O} 
• d3 = {mlm í. A and s2 E w and n2 = n3 = O} 
• d4 = {mlm í. A and s2 E z and nI = n2 = a} 
• d5 = {mlrn í. dg U dg U dI U d2 U d3 U d4 } 
The outcome function is as follows: 
• If m E dg go to Stage 2, game r a. 
• If m E dg go to Stage 2, game rb. 
• If m E dI then e is implemented when s2 =1 t~. Otherwise, f(sl, s2) is implemented. 
• If m E d2 then f (sI, w) is implemented if w = t~. Otherwise a is implemented. 
• If m E d3 U d4 then f (sI, s2) is implemented. 
• If m E d5 then the agent announcing the highest integer selects the outcome, breaking 
ties in favor of lower indices. 
Stage 2. Depending on t-he message at the first stage either r a or rb is operated. We first 
describe r a. 
Game r a : Agent 1 announces an element of {a, b, N ext} X N. Agent 2 announces an element 
of N. Agent 3 announces an element of N. Let us call q2 the integer announced by agent 2 
and q3 the integer announced by agent 3. The out come functian is as follows: 
• If agent 1 chooses a then implement a. 
• If agent 1 chooses b and q2 = q3 = O then implement b. 
• If agent 1 chooses N ext and q2 = q3 = a then go to the third stage. 
• In all other cases the agent announcing the highest integer implements her choice, break-
ing ties in favor of the agent with the lower indexo 
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Game rb is the same as r a, except that the roles of a and b are exchanged. For completeness, 
here is the description of rb. 
Game rb: Agent 1 announces an element of {a,b,Next} x N. Agent 2 announces an element 
of N. Agent 3 announces an element of N. The outcome function is: 
• If agent 1 chooses b then implement b. 
• If agent 1 chooses a and q2 = q3 = O then implement a. 
• If agent 1 chooses N ext and q2 = q3 = O then go to the third stage. 
• In aH other cases the integer game is operated. 
Stage 3. Agent 2 announces an element of {a, b} x N and agent 3 announces an element of 
{a, b} x N. The choice of the agent announcing the highest integer is implemented, breaking 
ties in favor of agent 2. 
We first prove that this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium yielding the desired 
sef. 
Proposition 2 There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium yielding the desired social choice 
function. 
Proof. We describe the equilibrium. 
• F1:rst Stage. Each agent tells the truth about the types she observes and announces 
ni = O. Agent 3 announces g = 0. 
• Second Stage. Beliefs are as follows: 
- Beliefs on agent 1 put probabilíty 1 on the type announced at Stage l. 
- For agent 2, if t~ has been observed then there is no need to define beliefs. Suppose 
agents 1 and 3 observe {t~, tn . Then beliefs put probability 1 on the type announced 
by 2, unless t~ is announced. In this case the belief is equal to the prior. 
- Beliefs are identical to the prior for agent 3. 
Strategies are the following: 
- r a: Agent 1 picks (a, O) if she told the truth at Stage 1 and (b, O) otherwise. Agent 
2 announces q2 = O and agent 3 announces q3 = O. 
- r b: Agent 1 picks (b, O) if she told the truth at Stage 1 and (a, O) otherwise. Agent 
2 announces q2 = O and agent 3 announces q3 = O. 
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• Third Stage. We first describe beliefs. Stage 3 can only be reached if agents 2 and 3 play 
according to the equilibrium strategy at stage 2, and the strategy does not depend on 
types. Thus the beliefs on 2 and 3 must be identical to the one held at Stage 2. Agent 
1 is the deviator, and we assume beliefs are unchanged. Strategies at Stage 3 are the 
foIlowing: 
- Suppose t~ has been observed. If t~ has been announced at Stage 1 then agents 2 
and 3 both announce (b, O) . If tt has been announced at Stage 1 then agents 2 and 
3 both announce (a, O) . 
- Suppose agent 3 has observed {t~, tn. Then either the belief on agent 2 is Pr(t~) = 1 
or Pr(tE) = 1. If t~ has been announced at Stage 1 then: 
* If Pr(t~) = 1 is the belief on agent 2 then both types of agent 3 announce (a, O). 
Type t~ of agent 2 announces (a, O) and type tE announces (b, O). 
* If Pr(tE) = 1 is the belief on agent 2 then both types of agent 3 announce (b, O) . 
Type t~ of agent 2 announces (a, O) and type tE announces (b, O) . 
If tl has been announced at Stage 1 then: 
* If Pr(t~) = 1 is the belief on agent 2 then both types of agent 3 announce (b, O). 
Type t~ of agent 2 announces (b, O) and type tE announces (a, O) . 
* If Pr(tE) = 1 is the belief on agent 2 then both types of agent 3 announce (a, O) . 
Agent 2 always announces (a,O). 
It is obvious that beliefs are consistent, so we only need to consider optimality of the 
strategies. 
At stage 3, each type of agent 3 is always obtaining the preferred outcome in the set {a,b}, 
given her beliefs. The strategy is therefore optima!. Type t~ is indifferent between the constant 
(with respect to the type of agent 3) function a and the constant function b. Constant functions 
are the only feasible outcomes given the strategy of agent 3, so any strategy is optima!. Type 
t~ always obtains the preferred out come in the set {a, b}, given her beliefs on agent 1. 
At stage 2, deviations by agent 2 or agent 3 can change the out come only if agent 1 has 
not told the truth at Stage 1, a zero-probability evento As for agent 1, the strategy described 
is clearly optima!. 
At stage 1, agent 1 can change the out come only if she lies about her type, which by 
incentive compatibility is not profitable. Agent 2 can only place the message in d2• This does 
not change the outcome if her true type is t~, and yields the constant function a otherwise. 
For type tE this is a strictly worse out come, and type t~ is indifferent between such an out come 
and the scf. We conclude that at Stage 1 no profitable deviations exists for agent 2. At last, 
consider agent 3. Type t~ is completely indifferent among all out comes. Type t~ cannot change 
the outcome when t~ is the true type of agent 2. If {t~, tn is observed then agent 3 can obtain 
that the constant function e be implemented. This gives the same expected utility as the 
equilibrium strategy, and it is therefore not a profitable deviation. O 
We now show that there are no equilibria with a different outcome. 
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Proposition 3 The1'e is no equilibrium in which the message is not in set dg U dg at the fi1'st 
stage, and the1'e is no equilib1'ium in which agent 1 chooses N ext 01' b with positive p1'obability 
at game fa, and N ext 01' a at game fb· 
Proof. If the choice by 1 is different from a with positive probability at fa then agent 2 
can obtain d with positive probability by announcing a sufficiently high number. The best 
response for 1 is to announce an higher number whenever a is not selected in order to obtain 
e. Thus the integer game is triggered, and no equilibrium exists. The reasoning is analogous 
for fb. 
Consider now the first stage. If the out come is in d1 U d3 U d4 U d5 with positive probability 
then 2 can announce 71,2 sufficiently high and obtain d with positive probability. But in this case 
agent 1 will announce an higher integer to get e. If the out come is in d2 then 1 can announce 
71,1 > O and obtain e, causing 2 to announce an higher integer to obtain d. No equilibrium 
exists. O 
Proposition 4 The1'e is no equilibrium in which the correct outcome is not implemented when 
agent 2 is of type t~. 
Proof. Flom proposition 3 we know that in equilibrium the second stage is reached with 
probability 1 and agent 1 chooses the same a11ocation prescribed by the type profile announced 
at the first stage. If t~ is the type of agent 2 then agent 1 knows exactly the payoff-relevant 
type profile. Thus, she will pick a when her type is t~ and are b when her type is t~ and the 
correct outcome is chosen in any equilibrium. O 
Proposition 5 There is no equilibrium in which the type of agent 2 is in the set {t~, tn and 
the types of agent 1 do not fully separate at Stage 1. 
Proof. If the set {t~, tn has been observed, agent 3 only cares about what happens when 
t~ is the true type. By proposition 3, equilibrium out comes can only be a or b. Let now Pa be 
the probability that the outcome is a when the type of agent 1 t~ and the type of agent 2 is 
t~. and Pb the probability that the outcome is b when the type of agent 1 is t~ and the type of 
agent 2 is t~. Then the expected utility in equilibrium for type t~ of agent 3 when agent 2 is 
of type t~ is: 
2 1 1 + Pb + 2pa 
U = 3Pa + 3 (2pb + (1 - Pb)) = 3 
Now observe that by asking that the constant function e be implemented agent 3 can obtain 
an expected utility of 1. Therefore, for this to be an equilibrium it must be the case that: 
1 + Pb + 2pa ~ 4 
This is only possible if Pa = Pb = 1, Le. type t~ always reaches fa when t~ is the true type and 
type t~ always reaches fb when t~ is the true type. Therefore, fu11 separation occurs. O 
Proposition 6 There is no equilibrium in whieh agent 2 is in the set {t~, tn and the two 
types of agent 2 do not fully separate at Stage 1. 
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Proof. We now know that 1 is separating. We first prove that it cannot be the case that 
the two types of agent 2 send the same message with probability 1, by showing that if this is 
the case then agent 1 will choose Next at stage 2. This can never happen in equilibrium. 
To see this, assume that agent 1 sends the message signaling that her type is t!, and assume 
that r a is reached in this case (the argument is analogous if r b is reached). Then, for this 
to be an equilibrium, it must be a best response for agent 1 to choose a. What happens if 
1 chooses Next? The belief on agent 1 at stage 3 must be Pr(t~) = 1 by the assumption of 
non-expanding support. Furthermore, in any equilibrium all types of agents 2 and 3 must 
announce O. Since stage 3 is reached only if 2 and 3 take the equilibrium action, beliefs on 2 
and 3 must be the same as at stage 2. Since 2 is pooling we must have Pr(t~) = !. Agent 3 
must pool in every equilibrium, so we also have Pr(t~) = !. 
The equilibrium outcome at stage 3 must be that a is selected when the type of agent 2 is 
t~ and b is selected when the type of agent 2 is t~. This follows from the fact that it cannot 
be the case that a function constant with respect to the types of agent 2 is the equilibrium 
outcome, since agent 3 would prefer a and type t~ would want b. Thus the outcome must be a 
function that selects a when the type of agent 2 is t~ and b when the type is t~. It is immediate 
to see that this is better for agent 1 than choosing a at r a. 
We have therefore proved that there is no equilibrium in which t~ and t~ completely pool. 
Notice that this implies that when the type of agent 2 is in {t;, t~} it can never be the case 
that agent. 2 claims to be t~. If this happened it would be necessary for agents 1 and 3 to report 
t~ as well, in order t.o make sure that the outcome is in dg U dg. But this would imply complete 
pooling of t~ and t~. 
We now show that no partial pooling occur. First observe that when the type of agent 2 
is t~ then it must be the case that a is obtained whenever the type of agent 1 is t; and b is 
obtained whenever the type of agent 1 is tg. Otherwise, it would be a profitable deviation for 
agent 3 to ask that the constant function e be implemented (remember that the set {t~, tn is 
reported with probability 1). On the other hand, since agent 1 is separating, it must be the 
case that t.ype t~ can obtain that b be implemented when the type of agent 1 is t~ and a be 
implemented when the type of agent 1 is tg. This implies that the two types of agent 2 fuUy 
separate. O 
Proposition 4 implies that the correct outcome is obtained whenever the type of agent 2 
is t~, and propositions 5 and 6 imply that the correct out come is obtained when the type of 
agent 2 is in the set {t~, t~}. This concludes the proof. O 
Remark. The only point of the proof in which we use the 'no expanding support' restriction 
on beliefs is in proposition 6. The assumption ensures that, if the belief at Stage 2 is Pr (t~) = 1 
and agent. 1 takes action Next, then at stage 3 beliefs will still be Pr (t;) = 1. However, a much 
weaker a.ssumption would suffice. 
In general, the following requirement would be sufficient: Suppose that a given stage k 
beliefs put probability 1 on a type Si of player i, and suppose that stage k + 1 is reached 
because of a deviation by agent i. Then the other players should revise their beliefs on agent 
i only if it is not possible to find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium at Stage k + 1 such that type 
si of agent i is strictly better off. In other words, when probability 1 is put on si then beliefs 
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change only if it is impossible to find a justification for the deviation by type si. This is clearly 
a much weaker restriction than 'no expanding support'. 
To see that the requirement would be sufficient, let's go back to the proof of proposítíon 6. 
Suppose that types t~, tl pool at Stage 1 (e.g. they both adopt the strategy íntended for type 
t~, as it happens in the deception equilibrium of the previous section) and that we end up in r a 
with Pr (t!) = 1. For this to be an equilibrium, agent 1 must choose that a be implemented. A 
deviation to N ext would be profitable for agent 1 if the belief at Stage 3 following the deviation 
were Pr (t!) > .5. Thus, the behavior of agent 1 can be 'justified', and agents 2,3 do not need 
to revise their beliefs. In fact, we can allow 'minor' revisions leading to Pr (t~) > .5. 
5 Conclusion 
It is instructive to see why the deception described in section 3 is not a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrillm of the mechanism just described. The deception was, roughly: agent 1 tells the 
truth about her type and claims that 2 is t~; agents 2 and 3 confirm the claim that t~ is 
the true type of agent 2. If any agent deviates, beliefs are chosen so that preferences about 
constant functions are such that behaving as if t~ had actually been observed is optimal at 
f1ll'ther stages. 
In our mechanism, we show that the deception can be broken in proposition 6, first parto 
The crucial step is that in our mechanísm at the second stage the beliefs under the deception 
are exactly defined, and there is no freedom in selecting them. Under the beliefs that should 
be held in the deception no equilibrium exists, sínce agent 1 has a profitable deviation from 
the only action that can possibly be part of an equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if the equilibrium had only one round of signaling the second stage 
would onl}' be reached out of equilibrium, and beliefs could be assigned to make sure that an 
equilibrium exists (and the deviation is not profitable). 
12 
Appendix 1 
Summary of agents' preferences. 
Agent 1 If the type of agent 3 is t~: 
a b e d 
t~, t~ 1 O 10 -1 
t~,t~ O 1 10 -1 
t~, t~ 1 O 10 -1 
tt, t~ O 1 10 -1 
tt, tt 1 O 10 -1 
t~, t~ O 1 10 -1 
If the type of agent 3 is tg: 
Agent 2 If the type is t~: 
a b e d 
t~,t~ 1 O 10 20 
t~, tg O 1 10 20 
t~,t~ O 1 10 20 
ti, ti 1 O 10 20 
If the type of agent 2 is either t~ or t~ then preferences only depend on the type of agent 
1. We have: 
a b e d 
t 1 a O 1 10 20 
ti 1 O 10 20 
Agent 3 If the type is t~ and the type of agent 2 is not t~: 
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a b e d 
t~, t~ 1 O 2 10 
t~,t~ O 1 2 10 
t~,t~ 1 2 O 10 
t~, t~ 2 1 O 10 
If either the type is tg or the type of agent 2 is t~ then: 
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Appendix 2 
Proof of proposition 1. 
Let G be a rnultistage rnechanisrn, and assurne that it has an equilibriurn with round of 
signaling (we will call this 'the original truthtelling equilibriurn'). For agent 1, let mL be the 
action taken at the first stage in the truthtelling equilibriurn when she is of type th, and it has 
been observed that the type of agent 2 is in the set z, with h = a,b and z E {{a,b} , {e}}. For 
agent 2, let m;k be the rnessage sent at the first stage when agent 2's type is t;, with j = a, b, e 
and the type of agent3 is t~, with k E {a,b} (notice that the type of agent 3 is reported only 
if j = b). At last, for agent 3 let m~y be the rnessage sent when agent 3's type is t~ and it has 
been observed that the type of agent 2 is in the set y E {{a, b} , {e} }. 
Before discussing the deception equilibriurn, let us observe that it can never be the case 
that in the subforrn following a deviation by agent 1 the outcorne e is obtained, since in this 
case agent 1 would have a profitable deviation (notice that agent 1 strictly prefers any social 
choice function in which e is obtained at sorne state of the world to the social choice function 
to be irnplemented). Analogously, agent 2 can never obtain e or d through a deviation. 
We now describe the deception equilibriurn, specifying the strategy profiles and beliefs for 
each history. 
First stage 
Agent 1: Type t~ of agent 1 sends rnessage m~c with probability 1. Type tb sends rnessage 
mL with probability 1. In other words, agent 1 always clairns that the type of agent 2 is 
t~ and tells the truth about her type. 
Agent 2 All types send rnessage m~ with probability 1. In other words, agent 2 always clairns 
that her type is t~. 
Agent 3 Message m~c is sent with probability 1, i.e. agent 3 always clairns that her type is 
t~ and that the type of agent 2 is t~. 
Further stages. 
Notice that, since the truthtelling equilibriurn has one round of signaling, whenever ih = 
(mL, m%j' m1z) with k E z (Le. the reports about agents' types agree) then the garne ends 
and the allocation f(th, t%) is irnplernented. We now deal with the other cases, describing in 
each case beliefs and strategies and proving that beliefs are consistent and the strategy profile 
constitutes a Bayesian equilibriurn at each stage given the beliefs. 
First observe that whenever t~ is the true type of agent 2 then this is cornrnon knowledge, 
and it is also cornrnon knowledge that the type of agent 3 is t~. Furtherrnore, notice that in 
this case the rnessage profiles which are issued are exactly the ones observed in the truthtelling 
equilibriurn (rernernber that 1 is telling the truth about her type). We will assurne that when 
t~ has been observed everything, Le. beliefs on agent 1 and strategies at further stages, is as 
in the original truthtelling equilibriurn. Since strategies at the first stage are as in the original 
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equilibrium, it is obvious that beliefs at further stages are acceptable and strategies at each 
stage are best responses. 
From this point on we will concentrate the analysis on the case in which it is common 
knowledge that the type of agent 2 is in the set {t~, tl}. We specify beliefs and strategies for 
each deviation. 
Agent 1 deviates In this case the message profile observed at stage 1 is (iñl, m~, m~c), with 
mI r/: {m~c,mtJ. When this happens agents 2 and 3 believe Pr (t~ liñl) = ~. Beliefs on agents 
2 and 3 are equal to the prior, conditional on {t~, tn having been observed, i.e. Pr(t~) = 
Pr(t~) = ! and analogously for agent 3. The strategy profile is the foHowing: 
AGENT 1: at each stage foHowing a given history H, let m~(H) be the message selected by 
the type t~ of agent 1 in the original truthteHing equilibrium when type t~ 01 a.gent 2 ha.s 
been observed, and let m6(H) be the corresponding action for type t6. Furthermore, let JL~(H) 
be the probability assigned to type t~ in the original equilibrium when t~ has been observed 
and after history H. Then, in the deception equilibrium both types of agent 1 choose m~(H) if 
JL~(H) :2 .5 and m~(H) otherwise. In other words, agent 1 always chooses the action prescribed 
to the type with the highest probability in the truthtelling equilibrium when the same history 
H and t~ have been observed. 
AGENT 2: after each history H aH types of agent 2 choose the same action selected by type t~ 
in the truthteHing equilibrium. 
AGENT 3: after each history H aH types of agent 3 choose the same action selected by t~ when 
type t~ has been observed in the truthteHing equilibrium. 
We assume that beliefs remain the same after each history. This is necessary along the 
equilibrillm path, since each type of each agent is taking the same action, and it is clearly 
acceptable off the equilibrium path. 
We have to show that there is no subgame in which sorne type of sorne agent has a profitable 
deviation in any subgame. Consider first agent 1 and observe that at each subgame she can 
only obtain constant functions (aH types of agents 2 and 3 adopting the same strategies). 
Among constant functions, aH types of agent 1 are indifferent between a and b, strictly prefer 
c and rank d lasto Thus, if a profitable deviation exists it must be the case that after sorne 
history a stage is reached where either the out come is d and agent 1 can obtain a different 
outcome or the out come is a or b and agent 1 can obtain c. Now observe that agent 1 is facing 
at each stage the same action profile as in the original equilibrium for the case in which t~ is 
common knowledge. It is immediate to see that the existence of such a deviation would imply 
that a profitable deviation is available to agent 1 in the original truthtelling equilibrium, a 
contradiction. 
Consider now agent 2. Only constant functions can be obtained and, given the beliefs on 
agent 1, preferences among constant functions for aH types are: d >- c >- a rv b. A profitable 
deviation can only exist if, at a given stage, the outcome is a or b and it is possible to obtain 
c or d, or the outcome is c and it is possible to obtain d. 
We can· show that this would also be a profitable deviation in the original truthtelling 
equilibrium. The reason why we cannot use the straightforward argument used for agent 1 is 
that agent 2 is not facing the same action profile as in the original equilibrium. Consider a 
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subgame reached after history H, and suppose J.L~ (H) > .5 (recall that this is the probability 
attached to type t~ after history H in the original equilibrium). In the original equilibrium it is 
possíble that, after history H, types t~ and t~ take different actions, say m~ (H) and m~ (H) . 
In the equilibrium we propose beliefs are different (each type of agent 1 has probability ~) and 
the action profile chosen by both types ís m~(H) with probabílity 1. However, we can still 
prove that the original action taken by agent 2 in the case in which t~ is common knowledge is 
a best response. Notice that in the original equilibrium, it cannot be the case that at a given 
stage the outcome is e for a type of agent 1 and not for the other type as well, since otherwise 
that type would deviate. We can assume that whenever in the original equilibrium a strategy 
profile at a given subgame yields e then both types of agent 1 take the same action. This is 
without loss of generaÜty, since even if the original equilibrium prescribes different actions we 
can construct another equilibrium in which both types take the same action. Similarly, if the 
outcome is d for one type of agent 1 it must be d for the other type as well, since it must mean 
that 1 cannot reach any other outcome. 
The implication is that whenever the outcome is e or d agent 2 is facing the same strategy 
profile as in the original equilibrium when t~ is the true type, so that no profitable deviation 
exists. We can therefore restrict attention to subgames where the outcome is a or b under the 
deception equilibrium. 
After an history H for which the outcome is expected to be a or b in the deception equi-
librium, it must be the case that the out come was in the set {a, b} for both types of agent 1 
in the original truthtelling equilibrium when t~ was observed. Suppose now that a profitable 
deviation exists in the deception equilibrium, moving the out come from a or b to e or d. Then 
the same deviation in the original truthtelling equilibrium would move the outcome from a or 
b to e or d with probability greater than .5, and at worst it moves the outcome to the les s 
preferred between a and b with probability les s than .5. This implies that type t~ would deviate 
in the original equilibrium, a contradiction. 
At last, let us consider agent 3. Given the beliefs on agent 1, all types of agent 3 are 
indifferent among the constant functions a, b, c. If a profitable deviation exists then at sorne 
stage it is possible to reach the out come d, but this would also be a profitable deviation in the 
original truthtelling equilibrium. 
Agent 2 deviates In this case the message profile observed at stage 1 is (mhc' iñ,2 , m~c), with 
iñ,2 =1 m~. Agent 1 believes Pr (t~, t~ 1m2) = 1. Agent 3 believes Pr (t~ 1m2) = 1. Beliefs on 
agent 1 are the same as in the truthtelling equilibrium. 
AGENT l. After each history H all types of agent 1 choose the same action as in the truthtelling 
equilibrium when type t~ has been observed. 
AGENT 2. After each history H all types of agent 2 choose the same action selected by type 
t~ in the truthtelling equilibrium. 
AGENT 3. After each history H all types of agent 3 choose the same action selected when type 
t~ has been observed in the truthtelling equilibrium. 
After each history H beliefs on agent 1 are the same as in the original equilíbrium when t~ 
is common knowledge. Beliefs on agents 2 and 3 remain the same after each history. Beliefs on 
agent 1 are acceptable because they were in the original equilibrium. Beliefs on agents 2 and 
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3 must be unchanged along the equilibrium path and are acceptable off the equilibrium path. 
Optimality for agent 1 follows from the fact that she can only obtain constant functions, 
and she is indifferent among the constant functions a, b or d. Profitable deviations must reach 
e, but in this case the original equilibrium would be broken. 
Consider now agent 2. Only functions which are constant in the type of agent 3 can be 
obtained. This implies that for any given type of agent 1, agent 2 is indifferent between a and 
b. A profitable deviation requires that at a given subform the outcome be moved from the set 
{ a, b} to {e, d} or from e to d for at least one type of player 1. Since beliefs on 1 and strategies 
are the same as in the original equilibrium when t~ has been observed, this would also be a 
profitable deviation in the original equilibrium. 
Type tl has the same preferences as t~, has the same beliefs as in the original equilibrium 
and is facing the same action profile. Thus, the strategy is optimal. 
As for agent 3, given the beliefs on agent 2 she is indifferent among out comes a, b, e, d. 
Agent 3 deviates In this case the message profile observed at stage 1 is (mL, m~, iñ3 ), with 
m3 f- m~C" Agent 1 and type t~ of agent 2 believe Pr (t~ liñ3 ) = O (remember that type tl 
observes the type of agent 3). Agents 2 and 3 believe Pr(tl) = 1. Agents 1 and 3 believe 
Pr(t~) = Pr(tl) = ~ (beliefs over 1 and 2 are obtained using the Bayes' rule). 
Strategies are as follows: 
AG ENT l. After each history H all types of agent 1 choose the same action selected in the 
truthtelling equilibrium when type t~ has been observed. 
AGENT 2. After each history H aH types of agent 2 choose the same action selected by type 
t~ in the truthtelling equilibrium. 
AG ENT 3. After each history H type t~ of agent 3 choose the same action selected by type t~ 
when type t~ has been observed in the truthtelling equilibrium. Type t~ selects at each stage 
a best response to the strategy profile of agents 1 and 2. 
Beliefs on agent 1 are as in the truthtelling equilibrium when t~ has been observed after 
each history. This is acceptable since the same strategies are being used. For agents 2 and 3 
beliefs remain the same after each history. This is necessary along the equilibrium path and 
acceptable outside. 
Given the beliefs, a profitable deviation exists for agent 1 only when it is possible to obtain 
e. Since she is facing the same strategy profile as in the truthteHing equilibrium when t~ has 
been observed, this would be a profitable deviation in that case as well. 
The behavior of agent 2 is optimal because she believes Pr(t~) = 1, so that her preferences 
when the type is t~ are the same preferences as ift~ were her type (this is also true independently 
of beliefs on agent 3 for type tl). Thus, she is facing the same action profile as in the original 
truthtelling equilibrium for the case in which t~ is common knowledge and she has the same 
preferences, implying that the original actions are still a best response. 
At last, consider agent 3. Optimality is obvious for type t~, and type t~ has is indifferent 
among aH outcomes. 
The cases in which two or more agents deviate can be treated in a similar way. 
The only thing which is left to show is that there is no profitable deviation at the first stage. 
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No profitable deviation exists for agent 1 because after a deviation she can at most obtain a 
constant functíon a or b with respect to the type of agent 2, and she is indifferent between 
the two constant functions (this is because the strategies of agents 2 and 3 are constant with 
respect to types, and e cannot be an out come because it would destroy the original equilibrium). 
Agent 2 cannot change the outcome through a deviation, i.e. the outcome must be a whenever 
agent 1 announces a type t~ and b whenever t~ is announced. If not, type t~ would have a 
profitable deviation in the original equilibrium. At last, consider a deviation by agent 3. A 
deviation can never lead to d. She gets the same social choice function that she obtains in the 
truthtelling equilibrium when t~ is observed. It is immediate to see that if the deviation is 
profitable under the deception then it would also be profitable in the truthtelling equilibrium 
when t~ is observed. . 
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